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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective regulation in fields like the environment, consumer
safety, and public health demands nimble responses t   
informa-
tiony, anchanging circumstances. 1  For thisle ason, the
international
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author’s owny, annott  cessarily those of the
U.S. Department of State or the
U.S.
Government.  The
author thanks Nick BagleetyEmily Berman, Sue Biniaz, Michael Bur-
stein, Barry Friedman, Daniel Ho, Jeremy Marwell, Nicholas Parrillo, Rick Pildes, Dick
Stewart, David Super, Michael Van Alstinety, anJudge Stephen F. Williams for their
thoughtful comments.
1. Cf. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24 (1938) (“[T]he art of reg-
ulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift re-
quirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures
707
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treaties that address these fields are not designed to be static docu-
ments.2  Like all treaties, they can be amended; in addition, these trea-
ties frequently contain mechanisms to adjust parties’ obligations over
time with respect to a limited set of issues without going through the
formal process of amendment and ratification.3  This feature of regu-
latory treaties—the possibility of elaborating or updating treaty norms
through a subsidiary decisionmaking process—makes some commen-
tators nervous, especially when this feature is combined with federal
statutory provisions that direct administrative agencies to incorporate
those subsidiary decisions into domestic law.  Specifically, some schol-
ars have suggested that this combination of treaties and implementing
legislation is unconstitutional because it delegates to international in-
stitutions power that should be held exclusively by the federal govern-
ment.4  This Article argues that legislation that pre-commits
administrative agencies to implementing such subsidiary decisions sur-
vives constitutional scrutiny.
Facing multifaceted and evolving international regulatory chal-
lenges,5 treaty negotiators have embraced the same moves that Con-
gress makes in the domestic regulatory arena.  Congress doesn’t
usually take upon itself the task of writing detailed legislation because
it generally lacks the requisite scientific and technical knowledge to
flesh out completely the details of its regulatory agenda.  Even if it
could overcome this obstacle, it would face the risk that its legislation
would quickly become obsolete, and enacting new legislation is a long
and uncertain process.  To mitigate these problems, Congress legis-
lates in broad strokes, harnessing the capacity of expert administrative
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to fill in
gaps and update regulations over time.
upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to realize
conclusions as to policy.”).
2. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (2006) (“Rules are
promulgated at a global level in order to be effective and efficient.  These rules need to
change over time in response to technical advances; one-shot codification in a static treaty
is inadequate.  The area being regulated requires highly detailed rules . . . ; broad treaty
language is insufficient.”).
3. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 182–83 (Comm. Print 2001) [here-
inafter TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS].
4. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 98–99 (2000).
5. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?,
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 106 (2005) (noting that the need for institutional speciali-
zation generally increases as global regulation increases).
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While no treaties so far have created full-fledged analogs to U.S.
administrative agencies, they have incorporated two features com-
monly associated with administrative law: reliance on expert bodies
and subsidiary decisionmaking procedures.  A number of recent trea-
ties create expert bodies to help the parties elaborate or update treaty
norms.  Take, for example, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants6—a treaty that requires parties to regulate twelve
chemicals defined in part by their resistance to degradation and their
concomitant tendency to cross international boundaries when re-
leased.7  The Convention creates a Review Committee of “govern-
ment-designated experts in chemical assessment or management”8 to
aid treaty parties in evaluating proposals to regulate additional chemi-
cals.9  Similarly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer10 obliges the parties to convene panels of experts at least
every four years to assess existing atmospheric control measures on
the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical, and eco-
nomic information.11
With aid from these expert bodies, the parties can elaborate or
update treaty norms by making subsidiary decisions through proce-
dures laid out in the individual treaties that are distinct from—and
less onerous than—the ordinary treaty-amendment process.12  Some
of these subsidiary decisions automatically bind all parties to the
treaty, while others do not.13  To the extent that these subsidiary deci-
sions are binding, parties to the treaty are obliged to incorporate
them into domestic law.
6. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M.
532 (entered into force May 17, 2004) [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
7. Id. (noting as a reason for negotiating the agreement “that persistent organic pollu-
tants possess toxic properties, resist degradation, bioaccumulate and are transported,
through air, water and migratory species, across international boundaries and deposited
far from their place of release, where they accumulate in terrestrial and aquatic ecosys-
tems”).  The twelve chemicals are: aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, hex-
achlorobenzene, mirex, toxaphene, polychlorinated biphenyls, DDT, polychlorinated
dibenzo-p-dioxins, and polychlorinated dibenzofurans. Id. annexes A–C.
8. Id. art. 19, para. 6(a).
9. See id. art. 8 (describing the Review Committee’s role in screening proposals).
10. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol].
11. Id. art. 6.
12. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 90–91 (discussing treaties that permit conferences of R
the parties to create regulations without following formal ratification procedures required
for treaty law).
13. See infra Part II.B–C.
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This Article focuses on the constitutionality of implementing leg-
islation that requires agencies like the EPA to take account of subsidi-
ary decisionmaking on the international plane.  Such implementing
legislation might direct an agency to publicize the actions of interna-
tional institutions by publishing notice in the Federal Register and
soliciting comments in response.  Or the legislation might direct an
agency to adjust substantive regulations in response to certain deci-
sions reached on the international stage.  Indeed, regulatory agencies
are likely to play an ever-greater role in assuring their countries’ con-
formity to various international regulatory treaties14—unless, that is,
arguments about the unconstitutionality of international delegations
prevent them from doing so.
Commentators have used the term “international delegation” to
describe a number of different arrangements that “vest continuing
lawmaking authority in an international institution.”15  The idea is
that by signing onto a treaty that contains mechanisms for elaborating
the treaty norms, the United States transfers to an international insti-
tution powers that belong to the federal government.16  These trans-
fers or grants of authority are constitutionally suspect because
international institutions are exercising authority that is properly held
exclusively by the federal government.
In an opinion issued last summer in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. EPA,17 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit invoked these nondelegation arguments in an ad-
ministrative law case.  The D.C. Circuit refused to read legislation im-
plementing the Montreal Protocol to require the EPA to promulgate
regulations incorporating certain subsidiary decisions made by the
parties to the treaty.18  As this Article will describe in greater detail,
these subsidiary decisions govern exemptions to the Montreal Proto-
col’s ban on the production or consumption of methyl bromide.  The
court concluded that the EPA’s compliance with those subsidiary deci-
14. See generally Stewart, supra note 5 (suggesting that United States administrative law R
should be applied to global regulatory regimes to ensure greater accountability among
international decisionmakers).
15. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1492, 1494 n.3 (2004).  Other commentators have defined the term more broadly.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation (Duke
Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 81, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&content=duke/fs (defining international delegation as “a
grant of authority by a state to an international body or another state to make decisions or
take actions,” regardless of whether those decisions or actions are binding).
16. Ku, supra note 4, at 72. R
17. 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter NRDC v. EPA].
18. Id. at 8–9.
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sions could not be enforced in court.19  If those subsidiary decisions
were binding on the EPA, the court wrote, there was a serious risk that
Congress had acted unconstitutionally by “assigning lawmaking func-
tions to [an] international bod[y].”20  That is, by pre-committing the
EPA to implement the subsidiary decisions regarding methyl bromide,
Congress would have unconstitutionally delegated its legislative au-
thority to an international institution.21
The consequences of giving less than full effect to treaty imple-
menting legislation are significant.  In the short term, it will shift to
the executive branch authority over treaty implementation that is ap-
propriately shared with Congress.22  In the long term, the approach
taken by the D.C. Circuit could threaten the ability of the United
States to commit to beneficial international regulatory treaties by er-
oding Congress’s willingness to pass implementing legislation and
thereby, paradoxically, undermining the ability of the President to ne-
gotiate such treaties in the first place.  Moreover, it could frustrate
efforts to bolster the accountability of international regulatory bodies
by limiting the availability of beneficial administrative procedures.
This Article argues that Congress can constitutionally enact legis-
lation that pre-commits the United States to implementing the subsid-
iary decisions of international institutions.  Nondelegation arguments
do not—and should not—pose any obstacles to such legislation.
When the admittedly lax test for violations of the domestic nondelega-
tion doctrine is applied, every one of these implementing statutes
passes muster.  And, in spite of the serious challenges that have been
raised regarding the accountability of international institutions—both
as a general matter and to United States voters in particular—there
are no compelling reasons for enforcing a more stringent version of
the nondelegation doctrine where agencies’ obligations are in some
way determined by or dependent on actions or decisions taken at the
international level.
Nor does such legislation pose any broader separation of powers
problems.  Proposed implementing legislation for the Stockholm
Convention has run into the objection that it interferes with the Presi-
dent’s exclusive negotiation authority,23 and other provisions imple-
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id.
22. Nondelegation arguments would not preclude Congress from enacting legislation
that permits, but doesn’t require, the executive branch to implement subsidiary decisions.
But such legislation would eliminate Congress’s say in whether such decisions should be
implemented or not.
23. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. R
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menting regulatory treaties are vulnerable to the same argument.  But
unlike statutory arrangements that the Supreme Court has found un-
constitutional, the legislation implementing regulatory treaties com-
ports with the separation of powers: by passing such legislation,
Congress neither aggrandizes its own authority nor encroaches on ex-
ecutive authority.
By subjecting these constitutional arguments to systematic analy-
sis, this Article seeks to dispel the notion that everything changes be-
cause Congress’s legislation addresses actions taken on the
international plane.  To the contrary, the analytical approach that
courts take in purely domestic contexts proves wholly adequate.  Re-
turning to the D.C. Circuit’s recent NRDC case, this Article argues that
the court erred in allowing inchoate nondelegation concerns to influ-
ence its analysis.  The court should have analyzed the statute no differ-
ently from other statutes delegating the task of promulgating
regulations to an administrative agency.  Such an approach would
make clear that Congress may pre-commit to domestic implementa-
tion of the contested decisions taken by the parties to the Montreal
Protocol, but would require Congress to be explicit if it intends to
require—rather than merely permit—the agency to implement the
subsidiary decision.
In focusing on legislation that implements regulatory treaties,
this Article addresses only one of the multiple targets of scholars who
are troubled by international delegations.24  In doing so, it highlights
the importance of tailoring analyses to specific types of potentially
problematic international delegations instead of lumping them to-
gether.  And by establishing that international delegation concerns
are of no moment in this area, this Article seeks to move the debate
forward by restricting the plausible applications of the international
nondelegation arguments.
II. KEY FEATURES OF REGULATORY TREATIES
To illustrate the stakes of this debate over international delega-
tions, this Part describes in greater detail two examples of regulatory
treaties that provide for subsidiary decisionmaking and the nondele-
gation disputes that have erupted over their implementing legislation.
First, however, Section A identifies the features that such regulatory
treaties have in common, and the features that their corresponding
24. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 4, at 93–113 (describing and categorizing examples of inter- R
national delegations); Swaine, supra note 15, at 1502–35 (same); Bradley & Kelley, supra R
note 15, at 9–16 (same). R
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implementing statutes share.  Section B sets out the first example, the
Montreal Protocol, and Section C focuses on the second, the Stock-
holm Convention.
A. Regulatory Treaties and Their Corresponding Implementing
Legislation
The Montreal Protocol and the Stockholm Convention illustrate
the key attributes of the regulatory treaties on which this Article fo-
cuses.  First, their subject matter is technical and complex.  Second,
the treaties oblige the United States to regulate intra-territorial con-
duct.25  Third, and most importantly, these regulatory treaties include
mechanisms for subsidiary decisionmaking—that is, mechanisms for
elaborating on or updating the parties’ obligations that are less oner-
ous than the ordinary process for amending the treaties.26
Focusing on this last feature, commentators have described the
subsidiary decisionmaking procedures set up by international regula-
tory treaties as having a “genuinely administrative character.”27  The
decisions are made “below the level of highly publicized diplomatic
conferences and treaty-making.”28  As might be expected given the
treaties’ technical subject matter, these subsidiary decisions frequently
rely on assessments by expert bodies.29  Finally, they are typically re-
stricted in scope and govern relatively uncontroversial technical mat-
ters30—although, as the United States’ experience with administrative
law over the last century clearly demonstrates, important policy judg-
25. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 23 (2005) (“Increasingly . . . regulatory
programs agreed to at the international level . . . are effectuated through measures taken
by governments at the domestic level to regulate private conduct.  Coordinated regulation
of private conduct is often the very purpose of the international scheme in fields such as
regulation of pollution or financial practices.”).
26. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 181–83 (dis- R
cussing various methods of treaty modification that do not require Senate advice and con-
sent); Stewart, supra note 5, at 69 (“While treaties require ratification, treaty-based regimes R
increasingly adopt regulatory measures through subsidiary lawmaking authorities, includ-
ing the conference of the parties, administrative bodies, and dispute settlement bodies.”).
27. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 25, at 17. R
28. Id.; see also Stewart, supra note 5, at 90 (suggesting that conferences of the parties R
are administrative in character because of their ability to create subsidiary norms without
having to follow ratification procedures required for treaty law).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 8–11. R
30. See MURPHY, supra note 2, at 92. (“The subject matter at issue is important, but is R
usually not politically sensitive nor characterized by significant policy differences among
states (whether developed or developing).”).
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ments are embedded in such technical decisions, which invariably
have redistributive effects.31
Beyond the Montreal Protocol and the Stockholm Convention,
treaties that share these features include the U.N. Convention on
Psychotropic Substances,32 “an international agreement aimed at halt-
ing the distribution and use of abusable psychotropic substances for
purposes other than legitimate medical and scientific ones.”33  At the
time that the Senate consented to it,34 the agreement obliged parties
to regulate thirty-two substances that were categorized into four sched-
ules based on their extent and potential for abuse and their recog-
nized therapeutic usefulness.35  The Convention on Psychotic
Substances includes procedures for adding new drugs, transferring
drugs to other schedules, and deleting drugs from the schedules.36
Another example is the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation, which not only prescribes general international aviation
rights and obligations, but also creates a mechanism for developing
and adopting more specific regulations to ensure the safety and facil-
ity of international aviation.37
The legislation implementing these regulatory treaties in the
United States likewise shares certain characteristics; it directs agencies
to “abide by, or otherwise take into account, lawmaking by interna-
tional institutions”38 in one of two ways.  First, there are content-assim-
ilation provisions.  Exemplified by the Montreal Protocol’s
implementing legislation, these provisions reflect Congress’s desire to
pre-commit to implementing the substance of subsidiary decisions of
international institutions (e.g., a decision to regulate a particular
31. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1683–84 (1975) (observing that applying legislative directives often requires
agencies to “reweigh and reconcile the often nebulous or conflicting policies behind the
directives” and that this balancing of policies is inherently discretionary and political).
32. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Feb.
21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the
United States, July 15, 1980) [hereinafter Convention on Psychotropic Substances].
33. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1193, at 1 (1978).  According to the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, “[p]sychotropic substances exert an effect on the mind and
thus are capable of modifying mental activity.” Id.
34. See Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)
35. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 32, Lists of Substances in the R
Schedules, 32 U.S.T. 734–737, 1019 U.N.T.S. 328–329.
36. See id. art. 2.
37. See MURPHY, supra note 2, at 92–95 (describing the creation of the International R
Civil Aviation Organization, an agency of the United Nations that is responsible for recom-
mending international air safety standards).
38. Swaine, supra note 15, at 1519. R
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chemical more stringently).39  Second, there are procedure-triggering
provisions.  Exemplified by the proposed implementing legislation for
the Stockholm Convention, these provisions direct agencies to take
certain procedural steps (e.g., supplying notice in the Federal Register
and requesting comments) when certain events occur on the interna-
tional plane.40  Both content-assimilation and procedure-triggering
provisions involve “international delegations” of Congress’s legislative
power in the sense that, like a statute, subsidiary decisions create obli-
gations for agencies to act.  As a relative matter, the content-
assimilation provisions pose a greater threat than do the procedure-
triggering provisions because they concern the substance of regula-
tions that can bind entities domestically.  While the overall methodol-
ogy for assessing the constitutionality of the two types of decisions is
the same, and while both types of provisions are constitutional, Parts
III and IV of this Article will demonstrate that the reasons they pass
constitutional muster differ slightly.
First, however, the next two sections will highlight the stakes of
the constitutional status of such implementing legislation.  Both Sec-
tion B, which focuses on the Montreal Protocol, and Section C, which
focuses on the Stockholm Convention, start by laying out the relevant
treaty framework and corresponding implementing legislation, then
discuss the nondelegation arguments that have been leveled against
the implementing legislation, and finally explain the consequences of
accepting those arguments.
B. The Montreal Protocol and NRDC v. EPA
The heart of the Montreal Protocol consists of schedules to phase
out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances.41
While the most significant modifications to the treaty, including
broadening the list of regulated substances, require a formal amend-
ment and the consent of the Senate to bind the United States, two
other types of modifications do not.  First, the parties can modify the
phase-out schedules of substances that the parties have already agreed
to regulate by “adjusting” rather than amending the treaty.  Adjust-
ments are made as follows: after an expert body reviews existing con-
trol measures on the basis of available scientific, environmental,
technical, and economic information,42 parties can submit proposals
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 2A–2I (setting forth the required gradu- R
ated reduction of certain chemicals by the parties).
42. Id. art. 6.
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to revise assessments of the harmfulness of already regulated sub-
stances or to further reduce the permitted levels of their production
or consumption.43  While “the Parties shall make every effort to reach
agreement by consensus,” adjustments can be adopted by a two-thirds
majority of the parties.44  Once adopted, adjustments are binding on
all of the parties.45  Second, the Montreal Protocol allows the parties
to make certain other subsidiary decisions.  Specifically, the Montreal
Protocol requires the parties to “hold meetings at regular intervals”46
where they will, among other things, “consider and undertake any ad-
ditional action that may be required for the achievement of the pur-
poses of this Protocol.”47  The Protocol does not specify whether the
decisions taken at such meetings (Article 11 decisions) are binding.48
The NRDC v. EPA case concerns decisions made under this latter
streamlined procedure.
As of January 1, 2005, the Montreal Protocol prohibits all con-
sumption and production of methyl bromide,49 an ozone-depleting
chemical that is used to sterilize fields before planting certain crops
and to fumigate structures such as grain mills.50  There is a significant
exception to this ban: it does not apply “to the extent that the Parties
decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is neces-
sary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be critical uses.”51  The Protocol
itself doesn’t define “critical use,” so in 1997, the parties issued an
Article 11 decision defining the term.52  (This decision is known as
“Decision IX/6,” so named for being the sixth decision made at the
ninth annual meeting of the parties.)  Decision IX/6 also permits the
43. Id. art. 2, para. 9.
44. Id. art. 2, para. 9(c).
45. Id. art. 2, para. 9(d).
46. Id. art. 11, para. 1.
47. Id. art. 11, para. 4(j).
48. Id. art. 11.
49. Id. art. 2H, para. 5.
50. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.1, .3, subpt. A, app. L (2006); see
also Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting Critical Uses From the
Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982, 76,983 (Dec. 23, 2004) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 82) [hereinafter Methyl Bromide Final Rules].
51. Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, art. 2H, para. 5. R
52. See U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision IX/6, para. 1(a), U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12 (Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Decision IX/6], available at http://
ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/09mop/9mop_12.e.pdf (defining a use as
critical if “the lack of availability of methyl bromide for that use would result in a signifi-
cant market disruption” and “[t]here are no technically and economically feasible alterna-
tives or substitutes”).
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production and consumption of methyl bromide for critical uses only
if:
(i) All technically and economically feasible steps have
been taken to minimize the critical use and any associated
emission of methyl bromide;
(ii) Methyl bromide is not available in sufficient quan-
tity and quality from existing stocks of banked or recycled
methyl bromide . . . ;
(iii) It is demonstrated that an appropriate effort is be-
ing made to evaluate, commercialize and secure national
regulatory approval of alternatives and substitutes . . . .53
In a subsequent 2004 meeting, the parties issued another decision—
Decision Ex. I/3—regarding methyl bromide.54  This decision set out
quantitative limits on use,55 and in addition provided that each party
“should ensure that the criteria in paragraph 1 of decision IX/6 are
applied when licensing, permitting or authorizing the use of methyl
bromide and that such procedures take into account available
stocks.”56
The key disputes in NRDC’s lawsuit against the EPA are whether
Article 11 decisions bind the United States as a matter of international
law and whether they bind the EPA as a matter of statutory law.57
There are three relevant provisions in the Montreal Protocol imple-
menting legislation.  The first, passed in 1998, provides: “To the ex-
tent consistent with the Montreal Protocol, the Administrator, after
notice and the opportunity for public comment, . . . may exempt the
production, importation, and consumption of methyl bromide for
53. Id. para. 1(b).
54. U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the First Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision Ex. I/3, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.ExMP/1/3 (Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Decision Ex. I/3], available at
http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/Ex_mop/1ex_mop_3.e.pdf.
55. First, Decision Ex. I/3 specified permitted levels of production and consumption of
methyl bromide necessary to meet critical uses in 2005. Id. para. 1.  The limit for the
United States was 7,659 metric tons. Id. annex II.B.  Second, in a complicated set of inter-
locking provisions, Decision Ex. I/3 permitted a level of critical use that exceeded the
consumption and production limit of 7,659 metric tons so long as the additional quantity
of methyl bromide came from existing stocks rather than new production. Id. paras. 2–3.
This last provision allowed the United States to use an additional 1,283 metric tons of
methyl bromide, for a total of 8,942 metric tons. Id. annex IIA.  This provision modifies
Decision IX/6, which provides that the production and consumption of methyl bromide
for critical uses is permissible only if “[m]ethyl bromide is not available in sufficient quan-
tity and quality from existing stocks of banked or recycled methyl bromide.”  Decision IX/
6, supra note 52, para. 1(b)(ii). R
56. Decision Ex. I/3, supra note 54, para. 5. R
57. NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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critical uses.”58  The second provision, passed in 1990 and closely fol-
lowing the United States’ ratification of the Montreal Protocol, Con-
gress amended the Clean Air Act and defined the term “Montreal
Protocol” to mean the “Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer” and “adjustments adopted by Parties thereto and
amendments that have entered into force.”59  (Neither party argued
that Decisions IX/6 or Ex. I/3 constitute adjustments to the Montreal
Protocol.60)  The third provision, also from the 1990 legislation, pro-
vides that
[the legislation] shall not be construed, interpreted, or ap-
plied to abrogate the responsibilities or obligations of the
United States to implement fully the provisions of the Mon-
treal Protocol.  In the case of conflict between any provision
of this subchapter and any provision of the Montreal Proto-
col, the more stringent provision shall govern.61
The EPA promulgated regulations that incorporated the quanti-
tative limits set out in Decision Ex. I/3,62 arguing that these were the
only binding aspects of the Article 11 decisions.63  NRDC disagreed.
It argued that the Article 11 decisions were binding on the United
States and on the EPA in their entirety, and that the production and
consumption of methyl bromide must be consistent both with the
quantitative limits written into Decision Ex. I/3 and the conditions
adopted in Decision IX/6.64  Thus, for example, notwithstanding the
quantitative limit on production, no new production would be permit-
ted if a sufficient quantity of methyl bromide were available from ex-
isting stocks.  The Methyl Bromide Industry Panel of the American
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(d)(6) (2000).  These amendments to the Clean Air Act were
contained in section 764 of the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-36, -37 (1998).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7671(9) (2000) (added Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 601, 104
Stat. 2399, 2650).
60. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 5.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7671m(b) (2000) (added Nov. 15, 1990, § 614, 104 Stat. at 2668).
62. See Methyl Bromide Final Rules, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982, 76,989 (Dec. 23, 2004) (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).  These rules provide that
[w]ith today’s action, EPA is finalizing a determination that 8,942,214 kgs [8,942
metric tons] of methyl bromide are required to satisfy critical uses for 2005. . . .
EPA is authorizing the full amount of new production/import allowable under
Decision Ex[.] I/3, a total of 7,659,000 kgs [7,659 metric tons], and is authorizing
those entities that hold inventories [or stocks] of methyl bromide to sell
1,283,214 kgs [1,283 metric tons] for approved critical uses during 2005.
Id.
63. Supplemental Brief for the Respondent at 5–11, NRDC, 464 F.3d 1 (No. 04-1438).
64. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 8; see also Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 4, NRDC, 464 F.3d
1 (No. 04-1438).
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Chemistry Council, as intervenor, made a more aggressive argument
than did the EPA: the Industry Panel argued that under the imple-
menting legislation no aspect of the Article 11 decisions was binding
on the United States under the Montreal Protocol or on the EPA
under the implementing legislation.65
If the NRDC’s interpretation is the correct one, these statutory
provisions are an example of content-assimilation provisions—those
where Congress pre-commits to implementing the substance of sub-
sidiary decisions.  Such provisions allow the United States to comply
with its international obligations promptly without requiring addi-
tional legislative action from Congress.  Such provisions also allow reg-
ulated entities or regulatory beneficiaries—like NRDC—to challenge
how the agency goes about implementing the international decision
to ensure that the agency is complying with both the international
decision and other congressional directives and whether the agency
has supported those choices with adequate explanations.
In the end, the D.C. Circuit reached the result for which the In-
dustry Panel had advocated: the court concluded that no aspects of
the Article 11 decisions bound either the United States or the EPA.66
Instead of engaging the question of whether and to what extent Con-
gress intended, by statute, to pre-commit the EPA to complying with
Article 11 decisions, the D.C. Circuit invoked the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance and held that the implementing legislation couldn’t
be interpreted to require the EPA to incorporate any aspect of Deci-
sions IX/6 or Ex. I/3.  If these subsidiary decisions were “enforceable
in federal court like statutes or legislative rules,” the D.C. Circuit
wrote, Congress has unconstitutionally “delegated lawmaking author-
ity to an international body.”67  The court found it “far more plausible
to interpret the Clean Air Act and Montreal Protocol as creating an
ongoing international political commitment rather than a delegation
of lawmaking authority to annual meetings of the Parties.”68  No
party—not even the Industry Panel—had articulated any such consti-
tutional argument or briefed the question at all.
As this Article will demonstrate, the D.C. Circuit’s embrace of the
international nondelegation argument in NRDC v. EPA sends a troub-
ling signal to Congress that courts may not take its legislation seri-
ously, and creates an inappropriate disincentive to Congress to
assume a relatively larger role in implementing international regula-
65. Supplemental Brief for Intervenor at 8–12, NRDC, 464 F.3d 1 (No. 04-1438).
66. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 8, 10.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 9.
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tory treaties.  In deciding on the basis of the nondelegation doctrine,
the D.C. Circuit not only deprived the legislation of its effectiveness,
but it also shifted exclusively to the executive branch authority that, as
Part III.C.3 will argue, is appropriately shared by all three branches.
Paradoxically, these decisions also take away power from the executive
branch by making it much more difficult for the United States to par-
ticipate in international arrangements that are structured to address
highly technical and quickly evolving problems like ozone depletion.
C. The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
The implementing legislation for the Stockholm Convention has
also been attacked on nondelegation grounds.  Although President
Bush declared that he would sign the Stockholm Convention in
2001,69 the United States is not yet a party to the Convention.  The
Senate will not ratify the treaty until Congress as a whole passes imple-
menting legislation.  That has yet to occur, in part because of the con-
stitutional debates described in this Section.
As the Introduction noted, the Stockholm Convention regulates
twelve different chemicals, and the Convention includes a mechanism
for regulating additional chemicals that meet certain scientific and
other criteria.70  Any party to the Stockholm Convention can initiate
the process of adding chemicals by submitting to the Secretariat a pro-
posal for listing a chemical, together with information about the char-
acteristics that qualify it as a Persistent Organic Pollutant (POP).71
The decision to list an additional chemical follows three stages of eval-
uation: (1) analyzing the proposal to ensure that the chemical is in
fact a POP;72 (2) assessing the risks of the POP to human health and
the environment;73 and (3) evaluating options for managing the risks
posed by the chemical while taking into account social and economic
effects of any controls imposed.74  At each stage, the Review Commit-
tee—a group of government-designated experts—makes an initial
69. Elizabeth Shogren, Bush Announces U.S. to Sign Pact to Ban Chemicals, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2001, at 17.
70. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. R
71. Stockholm Convention, supra note 6, art. 8, para. 1; see also id. annex D (requiring R
information relating to the chemical’s identity, persistence, bio-accumulation, potential for
long-range environmental transport, and adverse effects).
72. Id. art. 8, paras. 1–6.
73. Id. art. 8, para. 6; id. annex E.  The risk profile is designed to evaluate “whether the
chemical is likely, as a result of its long-range environmental transport, to lead to signifi-
cant adverse human health and/or environmental effects, such that global action is war-
ranted.” Id. annex E.
74. Id. annex F.
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evaluation that is distributed to parties and observers for feedback.75
The Review Committee then recommends whether a substance
should be regulated, and submits its recommendation to the parties
for a vote.76  The Convention obliges the parties to make every effort
to reach consensus, but allows amendments to be adopted by a three-
fourths majority of the parties if they are unable to reach a
consensus.77
But parties are not automatically bound by this vote as a matter of
international law.  At the time that a country becomes a party to the
treaty, it may choose either an opt-in or an opt-out approach with re-
spect to new listings.78  Under an opt-in approach, “a country would
not be bound [by an amendment] until it formally submitted an in-
strument indicating its acceptance of [the] amendment.”79  In con-
trast, under an opt-out approach, silence would be interpreted as
binding the party.80  That is, under opt-out, “a country would be
bound by an amendment unless it explicitly opted out through notifi-
cation under the convention.”81  During the 2002 Senate hearing on
the Stockholm Convention, the State Department indicated that the
United States would choose the opt-in approach so that it would not
be bound until it positively affirmed that it had accepted the listing of
that chemical.82
Implementing legislation was introduced that required the EPA
to publish notice in the Federal Register and solicit comments when-
ever proposals for listing new chemicals under the Stockholm Conven-
tion advanced through any of the three stages that were prerequisites
75. See id. art. 8, para. 4(a) (requiring the Review Committee to make the listing propo-
sal and the Committee’s evaluation available to all parties and observers and to solicit addi-
tional information from them); id. art. 8, para. 6 (requiring the Review Committee to take
into account additional information received by parties and observers, to make a draft risk
profile available to all parties and observers, and to complete the risk profile after taking
into account comments from parties and observers); id. art. 8, para. 7(a) (requiring the
Review Committee to invite parties and observers to submit information relating to the
socio-economic factors relevant to the risk management decision).
76. Id. art. 8, para. 9.
77. Id. art. 21, para. 3.
78. Id. art. 25, para. 4; see also Peter L. Lallas, The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 706 (2001) (explaining the difference between an
opt-in or an opt-out approach).
79. Lallas, supra note 78, at 706. R
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Implementation Act: Hearing on S. 2118
Before the S. Comm. on the Env’t & Pub. Works, 107th Cong. 9–10 (2002) (statement of Jeffry
M. Burnam, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Env’t, Bureau of Oceans & Int’l Envtl. & Scientific
Affairs, Dep’t of State).
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for regulating new chemicals.83  As one environmental group ex-
plained it, these notice-and-comment provisions were designed to
“give interested stakeholders a timely opportunity to learn of the vari-
ous stages of the international listing procedure,” and to “allow those
stakeholders to provide relevant information to EPA, which EPA
might elect to consider through the course of the international nego-
tiations.”84  Industry groups also supported the provision.85
As Section A indicated, these notice-and-comment provisions are
a key example of procedure-triggering provisions: under these provi-
sions, subsidiary decisions taken on the international plane trigger the
agency’s obligation to take certain procedural steps, but have no sub-
stantive regulatory consequences.  Both the implementing legislation
for the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the proposed im-
plementing legislation for the Stockholm Convention require agen-
cies to provide notice and solicit comments whenever proposals for
regulating new substances progress through the stages that might
culminate in treaty regulation.86  These provisions “delegate” to the
international institutions to the extent that the timing of the decision-
making process on the international plane determines when the
agency will be obliged to supply notice and request comment.  But
because the requirements these provisions impose are purely proce-
dural, they don’t delegate any substantive policymaking authority to
agencies.87
83. S. 1486, 108th Cong. § 502(e)(2), (3)(A)–(C) (2004).
84. Memorandum from Glenn Wiser, Senior Attorney, Center for Int’l Envtl. Law
(Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ciel.org/POPs/Memorandum_Stockholm_5Apr04.
html.
85. See, e.g., Mary Beth Polley, Treaty Implementation Language Held Up by Constitutional
Debate, PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS, Apr. 12, 2004, at 15 (referring to positive com-
ments of Pat Donnelly, Executive Vice President of CropLife America).  CropLife America
is “the national trade organization representing the nation’s developers, manufacturers,
formulators and distributors of plant science solutions for agriculture and pest manage-
ment in the U.S.”  CropLife America, About CropLife America, http://
www.croplifeamerica.org/design_06/viewer.asp?pageid=30 (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(2) (2000) (requiring the Secretary of State to provide notice
and comment for adding a substance to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances); S.
1486, 108th Cong. § 505(d)(3) (2004).
87. If the agency failed to undertake notice and comment, a challenging party would
presumably file a suit to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld” under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).  This is the route that plaintiffs used in Japan
Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230–31 n.4 (1986).  The plaintiffs
there sued the Secretary of Commerce for violating legislation passed by Congress to en-
sure the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Id.
at 228–29.  The Secretary argued that the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action, but the Court
concluded that this provision of the Administrative Procedure Act supplied it. Id. at
230–31 n.4.
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The executive branch nevertheless objected to the provisions in
the proposed implementing legislation for the Stockholm Convention
on nondelegation grounds.  Assistant Attorney General William Mos-
chella indicated that the proposed legislation was problematic in part
because the timing of the notice-and-comment period was to be deter-
mined by the actions of an international body.88  The argument in this
letter parallels an objection that President George W. Bush articulated
in his signing statement accompanying the Clean Diamond Trade Act.
The Clean Diamond Trade Act implements an internationally devel-
oped certification process to exclude “conflict diamonds” from inter-
national trade.89  The implementing legislation provides that the Act
shall take effect on the date that the President certifies to Congress
that either the World Trade Organization granted an applicable
waiver or the United Nations Security Council adopted an applicable
resolution.90  In his signing statement, the President objected that if
this statutory provision “imposed a mandatory duty on the President
to certify to the Congress whether either of the two specified events
has occurred and whether either remains in effect, a serious question
would exist as to whether [that provision] unconstitutionally dele-
gated legislative power to international bodies.”91  Like the notice-
and-comment provisions that implement the Stockholm legislation,
the decisions made by the international bodies in the Clean Diamond
Trade Act do not shape the content of the domestic regulation, but
rather simply determine the time that it takes effect.  In comparison
to the Montreal Protocol example above, the domestic impact of the
international bodies’ decisions is relatively trivial: instead of determin-
ing some of the content of regulations issued by the EPA, the decision
determined when the agency would publish notice in the Federal
Register.
If this nondelegation argument is correct, then agencies are pre-
cluded from a salutary measure that might mitigate the uneasiness
that international decisionmaking can engender.  Notice-and-
88. Letter from William Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Senator Tom Harkin
(Mar. 25, 2004)  [hereinafter Moschella Letter] (on file with author) (proposing an alter-
native notice-and-comment requirement that “is based on the calendar, relates to informa-
tion that is publicly available, and is not linked to decisions in the international process”).
The letter also argued that by requiring the administration, through the EPA, to report on
the actions of an international body, the notice-and-comment provisions would interfere
with the President’s sole authority over the United States’ negotiations with other coun-
tries. See infra Part IV.
89. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3913 (Supp. 2005).
90. Pub. L. No. 108-19, § 15, 117 Stat. 631, 637 (2003).
91. Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
491 (Apr. 25, 2003).
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comment procedures like the ones in the proposed implementing leg-
islation can help make regulatory information easily accessible to all
interested individuals in the United States, and broad participation is
“likely to aid in the agencies’ policymaking by generating alternatives
and documenting their impact on the various components of the col-
lective social welfare.”92  Agencies will have less access to such infor-
mation in the absence of such procedures.93  While many of the
groups that have participated in the debate about domestic imple-
mentation of the Stockholm Convention have sought observer status
to attend the meetings of the parties,94 it remains a very small circle.
For starters, only those groups with resources to travel the globe can
attend the meetings of the Stockholm Convention.  Because the first
such meeting took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay,95 this is no small
concern.  The notice-and-comment proceedings would make available
information about the Stockholm Convention to a wider group of in-
dustry representatives, public interest groups, journalists, academics,
and scientists—many of whom have a stake or interest in the Stock-
holm Convention’s proceedings.96
92. Stewart, supra note 31, at 1749; see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incor- R
porating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 163 (1998) (“And while the process
may not provide much opportunity for genuine deliberation about regulatory values,
rulemaking does seem well-suited for the exchange of information about competing
groups’ regulatory preferences and for agency-initiated compromise.”).
93. Richard Stewart has highlighted the difficulty public interests groups may have in
having an effect on international policy:
[G]lobal regulatory decisionmaking often occurs in distant locations such as Ba-
sel or Geneva.  Transnational “club” mechanisms in global regulatory regimes
make it very difficult for concerned interests in the United States, and especially
for less well-organized consumer, environmental, and other “public” interests, to
acquire the information and to organize effectively in order to influence such
decisions.
Stewart, supra note 5, at 82–83.  Stewart also notes that “[p]rocess-based criticism[s]” of the R
domestic impact on international regulation focus on the “lack of adequate opportunity
for effective access to information, participation and input in global regulatory decision-
making on the part of affected global or domestic publics.” Id. at 71.
94. See Stockholm Convention, supra note 6, art. 19, para. 8 (authorizing any body or R
agency not a party to the Convention but qualified in matters covered by the Convention
to be admitted to the Conference of the Parties as an observer).
95. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm Convention
COP-1, http://www.pops.int/documents/meetings/cop_1/meeting_info.htm.
96. Cf. David A. Wirth, Public Participation in International Processes: Environmental Case
Studies at the National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 17–22
(1996) (discussing the successful involvement of nongovernmental private sector advisors
from industry groups and environmental organizations in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s environmental activities).
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III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATIONS?
The textual hook for the nondelegation doctrine appears in Arti-
cle I of the Constitution, which assigns “all legislative Powers herein
granted [to the] Congress.”97  Although skeptics of the doctrine point
out that this language does not explicitly ban delegations of legislative
power,98 the Supreme Court has long insisted that a limit on legisla-
tive delegations exists.99  Of course, the trick in policing delegations is
drawing the line between those that are permissible and those that are
not.  After finding two violations in 1935, the Supreme Court soon
gave up striking down statutes for excessive delegations.100
The nondelegation doctrine does hold some intuitive appeal: it
follows from the idea that Congress, as “the branch of our Govern-
ment most responsive to the popular will,”101 ought to make the tough
choices that passing legislation may require instead of passing them
off to unelected bureaucrats.102  Moreover, many commentators see
virtue in the way the nondelegation doctrine burdens legislation,
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
98. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (2002) (arguing that this clause offers no insight as to “whether an
otherwise valid statutory grant of authority can ever ‘amount to’ a delegation of legislative
authority”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000)
(“The Constitution does grant legislative power to Congress, but it does not in terms forbid
delegation of that power . . . .”).
99. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 38–40
(6th ed. 2006) (discussing the Court’s nondelegation decisions).
100. These two 1935 cases both arose out of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), a major piece of legislation designed to help ease the economic burdens imposed
by the Depression. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (finding
unconstitutional an executive order issued under the NIRA because it did not offer any
intelligible standard for the Executive to follow); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935) (striking down a section of the NIRA as an impermissi-
ble delegation of legislative authority because it allowed the President “virtually unfet-
tered” authority to change substantive legal rights under the guise of determining fair
competition standards); see also BREYER ET AL., supra note 99, at 40–42 (discussing Panama R
Refining and Schechter).  The Supreme Court hasn’t found any delegations unconstitutional
since, but, as Cass Sunstein points out, a weaker form of the nondelegation doctrine sur-
vives in the form of interpretive canons. See Sunstein, supra note 98, at 329–37. R
101. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
102. See Jack Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This Buck?, 64
TEX. L. REV. 131, 145 (1985) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine “remains our most
effective barrier against massive, broad delegations of lawmaking power from the politically
accountable legislature to unelected administrators”); see also Sunstein, supra note 98, at R
319–20 (noting that enthusiasts of the nondelegation doctrine point to constitutional pur-
pose and structure as well as the political accountability of Congress as support for the
doctrine). But see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 98, at 1748 (arguing that even when R
Congress delegates power it still remains accountable: “citizens will hold Congress respon-
sible for the poor design of the agency, or for giving it too much power or not enough, or
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thereby protecting individual liberty by ensuring that “national gov-
ernmental power may not be brought to bear against individuals with-
out a consensus, established by legislative agreement on relatively
specific words, that this step is desirable.”103  Finally, “the doctrine en-
sures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated leg-
islative discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable
standards.”104
Although some commentators have questioned the relevance of
domestic nondelegation analysis in the international arena,105 this Ar-
ticle argues that where the focus of the inquiry is the validity of imple-
menting legislation, the domestic nondelegation doctrine—which
measures whether Congress has failed to supply enough content in
the legislation it passes—is exactly appropriate.  Section A shows that,
under current law, no delegation problems plague either content-
assimilation or procedure-triggering provisions.  Section B evaluates
and ultimately rejects the normative argument that courts should em-
ploy a more stringent version of the domestic nondelegation doctrine
to evaluate international delegations on account of the characteristics
of international institutions to which Congress has “delegated”
authority.
A. Assessing Delegations Under Current Law
Applying the nondelegation doctrine as it stands today, there is
no support for the argument that Congress inappropriately surren-
ders its legislative authority by pre-committing agencies to implement-
ing subsidiary decisions made by parties to a regulatory treaty.  The
fact that the implementing legislation depends on the decisions of a
body that is not part of the federal government does not change this
analysis—nor does the fact that the implementing legislation prospec-
tively assimilates the decisions of international institutions.  These
conclusions are fairly straightforward based on the guideposts that ex-
isting case law supplies.
The most familiar type of nondelegation argument—and one
that has reached the Supreme Court on multiple occasions—is that
Congress has delegated too much discretion to the executive branch.
As the doctrine stands today, Congress’s sole obligation is to supply
for giving it too much money or not enough, or for confirming bad appointments, or for
creating the agency in the first place”).
103. Sunstein, supra note 98, at 320. R
104. Indus. Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Execu-
tive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1701 (2003).
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the executive branch to which it is delegating an “intelligible princi-
ple.”106  The Court is explicit that “intelligible principle” means some-
thing less than supplying agencies with a determinate criterion for
drawing lines between permissible and prohibited conduct.107  The
toothlessness of the nondelegation doctrine is perhaps best illustrated
by the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the congressional directive to
regulate in the “public interest” supplies the requisite intelligible prin-
ciple.108  Although the Court has not explicitly disavowed the possibil-
ity that it might find a delegation unconstitutional, the doctrine today
allows Congress to legislate in rough sketches without providing agen-
cies much guidance about how to make the tough choices that imple-
mentation will clearly require.
As between the legislative and executive branch, Congress has
supplied the requisite intelligible principle in both the procedural
provisions and the content-incorporation provisions described above.
In Mistretta v. United States,109 the Supreme Court concluded that Con-
gress had more than satisfied the requirements of the nondelegation
doctrine in legislation creating the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, pointing out that Congress had charged the Commission with
specific goals and specific tools for achieving them.110  Congress does
the same when it directs an agency to implement a treaty: the underly-
ing policy goals and tools for achieving them are clear—they are laid
out in the corresponding treaty.  The range of possible outcomes is
fairly predictable at the time that Congress is passing its implementing
legislation.  Additionally, reviewing courts would have no difficulty as-
certaining whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.111
That said, this analysis does not identify what is troubling about
the legislation—the role that it assigns to international institutions.
The intelligible-principle analysis does not quite fit when evaluating a
“delegation” to an international body.  Looking for an intelligible
principle makes sense when Congress is delegating to an agent.  But
when Congress passes treaty implementing legislation, the interna-
106. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“[W]hen Congress
confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform.” (alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
107. Id. at 475.
108. Id. at 474.
109. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
110. Id. at 374.
111. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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tional body is not Congress’s agent in the same way that an administra-
tive agency is: unlike an administrative agency, an international body
is under no obligation to pay any heed to Congress’s instructions, no
matter how detailed they are.112  A different set of cases, following
from two largely obscure Supreme Court cases, proves more helpful in
assessing procedure-triggering and content-assimilation provisions.  In
these cases, Congress has attached some kind of legal significance to
the decision of an entity outside of the federal government.
1. Evaluating Procedure-Triggering Provisions
The Supreme Court has explicitly upheld congressional legisla-
tion where the scope of the agency’s regulatory authority depended in
part upon the vote of a group of private individuals.  In Currin v. Wal-
lace,113 decided in 1939, the Supreme Court upheld against a nondele-
gation challenge a statute that conditioned the Secretary of
Agriculture’s authority to regulate on the consent of a supermajority
of regulated entities.114  The challenged statute—the Tobacco Inspec-
tion Act—had authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to “designate”
certain tobacco markets if two-thirds of the tobacco growers selling at
that market consented.115  Once the Secretary designated a market,
the Act required tobacco sold there to be inspected and certified ac-
cording to standards set by the Secretary.116  The Court found that
the required referendum does not involve any delegation of
legislative authority.  Congress has merely placed a restric-
tion upon its own regulation by withholding its operation as
to a given market “unless two-thirds of the growers voting
favor it.”  . . .  Here it is Congress that exercises its legislative
authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the
conditions of its application.  The required favorable vote
upon the referendum is one of these conditions.117
The Court affirmed this result later the same year when it relied on
Currin to uphold an analogous provision regulating the dairy industry
112. Although they are not obliged to, decisionmakers on the international plane are
likely to pay some attention to the preferences of the United States as well as other parties
to the treaty.  Because the executive branch represents the government on the interna-
tional stage, however, Congress’s input would be diminished.
113. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
114. Id. at 15–18.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 15–16.
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against a nondelegation challenge in United States v. Rock Royal Co-oper-
ative, Inc.118
This analysis is right on point: when Congress directs an agency
to supply notice and solicit comments whenever an international insti-
tution undertakes a specified action, the content of Congress’s direc-
tive to the agency does not vary, but an entity outside the federal
government can pull an on/off switch.  When it enacts such contin-
gent legislation, the Court has found, Congress is exercising its au-
thority rather than delegating it.119
Currin does not cover content-assimilation provisions—those
where Congress pre-commits agencies to implementing the subsidiary
decisions of the international institution.  For this type, the decision
made on the international level shapes some of the content of the
agencies’ actions instead of just being an on/off switch triggering an
agency obligation to provide notice and solicit comments.
2. Evaluating Content-Assimilation Provisions
Another line of cases addresses this type of legislative provision.
In United States v. Sharpnack,120 the Supreme Court upheld a statute
that incorporates new content over time, even though that content
was determined by an entity outside the federal government.  In
Sharpnack, the Supreme Court considered a delegation challenge to
the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, which provides that in federal en-
claves, including air force bases, “acts not punishable by any enact-
ment of Congress are punishable by the then effective laws of the
State in which the enclave is situated.”121  The statute explicitly assimi-
lated both existing and future state laws, and the Court upheld it
against a nondelegation challenge:
The basic legislative decision made by Congress is its deci-
sion to conform the laws in the enclaves to the local laws as
to all offenses not punishable by any enactment of Congress.
Whether Congress sets forth the assimilated laws in full or
assimilates them by reference, the result is as definite and as
ascertainable as are the state laws themselves.
118. 307 U.S. 533, 577–78 & n.64 (1939).
119. Julian Ku reported that not all courts have followed the approach set out in Currin.
See Ku, supra note 4, at 118 n.167 (citing Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United R
States, 841 F. Supp. 1479, 1491 (D. Or. 1994)).  The reasoning of the outlier case he identi-
fied was rejected on appeal. See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States, 110
F.3d 688, 694–96 (9th Cir. 1997).
120. 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
121. Id. at 287.
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Having the power to assimilate the state laws, Congress
obviously has like power to renew such assimilation annually
or daily in order to keep the laws in the enclaves current with
those in the States.  That being so, we conclude that Con-
gress is within its constitutional powers and legislative discre-
tion when, after 123 years of experience with the policy of
conformity, it enacts that policy in its most complete and ac-
curate form.  Rather than being a delegation by Congress of
its legislative authority to the States, it is a deliberate continuing
adoption by Congress for federal enclaves of such unpre-
empted offenses and punishments as shall have been already
put in effect by the respective States for their own
government.122
Congress certainly has the authority to adopt the subsidiary decisions
of regulatory treaty parties after those actions have been taken; Sharp-
nack says that under those circumstances Congress can pass a statute
that assimilates—or continually adopts—those actions.
A number of circuit court cases have extended this reasoning to
the international context, supporting the conclusion that the content-
incorporation provisions on which this Article focuses would likewise
survive scrutiny under the nondelegation doctrine.  These cases con-
cern the Lacey Act,123 a statute that prospectively assimilates the deci-
sions of governmental bodies outside the United States by making
commercial trade in fish, wildlife, or plants taken in violation of foreign
law a crime.124  One circuit found that “foreign law” even includes
regulations passed by bureaucracies in foreign governments.125  It is
true, as one commentator noted, that the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the constitutionality of this provision of the Lacey Act.126  But
this may be in part because the circuit courts that have considered
nondelegation objections to the Lacey Act have found them merit-
less.127  Two have gone so far as to label such challenges “frivolous.”128
122. Id. at 293–94 (emphasis added).
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3778 (2000).
124. Id. § 3772(a); see also Ku, supra note 4, at 105–06 (discussing Lacey Act cases); R
Swaine, supra note 15, at 1520–21 (same). R
125. United States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1391–92 (9th Cir. 1991).
126. Ku, supra note 4, at 106. R
127. E.g., United States v. Hansen-Sturm, 44 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1979).
128. See Hansen-Sturm, 44 F.3d at 795 (“[T]he contention that the Lacey Act is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of congressional authority is frivolous.”); Molt, 599 F.2d at 1219 n.1
(“Defendants’ objections to the constitutionality of the Lacey Act were not ruled upon by
the District Court, but are patently frivolous.”).
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Neither Sharpnack nor the Lacey Act cases address the limits of
Congress’s authority to legislate by assimilating other sources of law.
Indeed, Sharpnack is open to criticism that the “deliberate continuing
adoption” language is meaningless: the constitutionality of what Con-
gress did cannot sensibly depend on a hypothetical statute that Con-
gress might have passed.
In analyzing such statutes, courts are looking for the same thing
that they look for when Congress delegates to an executive branch
agency—some indication that Congress itself made an affirmative pol-
icy choice.  Thus, in Currin, the Supreme Court declared that “it is
Congress that exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation
and in prescribing the conditions of its application,”129 and in Sharp-
nack the Court spoke of the “basic legislative decision made by Con-
gress.”130  The Eleventh Circuit’s Lacey Act decision, echoing the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Currin as well as in Sharpnack, likewise
searched for evidence that Congress had made an affirmative policy
choice in deciding to assimilate foreign law:
Congress stated its concern with the environmental and eco-
nomic effects of the illegal wildlife trade, as well as its desire
to encourage state and foreign governments in their protec-
tion of wildlife and plants.  To accomplish the dual purpose
of eliminating this illegal trade and of protecting wild flora
and fauna, Congress has made it a United States crime to
take, to sell, or to transport wildlife taken in violation of any
foreign law relating to wildlife.  Congress, itself, has set out
the penalties for violation of these Lacey Act provisions.
Thus, Congress has delegated no power, but has itself set out
its policies and has implemented them.131
The breadth of the assimilation also helps to assess whether Congress
made the requisite affirmative policy choice.  Justice Scalia observed as
much in the context of analyzing the nondelegation claim in Whitman
v. American Trucking Ass’ns.132  Justice Scalia noted that the broader
the legislation’s reach and the greater its impact, the more is de-
manded of Congress: “While Congress need not provide any direction
to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define ‘country
elevators,’ which are to be exempt from new-stationary-source regula-
129. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16 (1939) (emphasis added).
130. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293 (1958) (emphasis added).
131. Rioseco, 845 F.2d at 302 (citations omitted).
132. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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tions governing grain elevators, it must provide substantial guidance
on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy.”133
B. Should International Delegations Meet a Different Standard?
Although courts did not evaluate the characteristics of the enti-
ties whose decisions congressional statutes took into account in any of
the cases described in the previous Section,134 the instinct that some-
thing is different when entities are foreign or international is wide-
spread.  Two commentators—Julian Ku and Edward Swaine—argue
that, as a normative matter, delegations to international bodies should
be analyzed differently from domestic delegations due to the charac-
teristics of international bodies.  These distinctions make delegations
to international bodies even more troubling, they argue, than delega-
tions to states or private parties.135  Ku argues that these distinctions
justify a revival of the nondelegation doctrine,136 while Swaine makes
the more modest argument that these distinctions merit attention.137
In articulating what they have found troubling about interna-
tional delegations, these commentators have had in mind the entire
universe of institutional arrangements that can amount to “interna-
tional delegations.”  As the introduction noted, commentators have
discerned troubling international delegations in any arrangement
that vests “continuing lawmaking authority in an international institu-
tion.”138  This Article has focused on what could be classified as inter-
national delegation of legislative authority.  Commentators have
identified both other means of delegating legislative authority and
delegations of other types of authority.  For example, commentators
have identified international delegations of legislative authority in the
absence of any statute passed by Congress where courts interpret the
subsidiary decisions of international bodies to be self-executing.  The
international body would be “legislating” because despite the absence
133. Id. at 475 (citation omitted).
134. Perhaps the most extreme example in this regard is United States v. Lee, a Lacey Act
case in which the Ninth Circuit saw no constitutional obstacle to a criminal statute assimi-
lating the content of foreign regulations issued by a foreign bureaucracy.  937 F.2d 1388,
1391–92 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. See Ku, supra note 4, at 121–30; Swaine, supra note 15, at 1554–66. R
136. Ku, supra note 4, at 121 (arguing that “peculiar characteristics of international dele- R
gations . . . support adopting a more formalist analysis of international delegations than
the Court has adopted in the state and domestic context”).
137. More specifically, Swaine suggests that he does “not attempt any dramatic revival of
the nondelegation doctrine,” but only seeks “to explain why international delegations are
distinctive in principle from ordinary legislative acts and deserve evaluation as such.”
Swaine, supra note 15, at 1556. R
138. See supra notes 15 & 24 and accompanying text. R
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of relevant congressional action, courts in the United States would be
obliged to enforce the action in exactly the same way that courts are
obliged to enforce statutes.139  “[B]ecause these agreements increas-
ingly seek to regulate areas of private party conduct,” argues Julian
Ku, “these agreements can serve as an alternate mechanism for do-
mestic legislation.”140  As for delegating other types of authority, com-
mentators have identified delegations of executive, judicial, and
treaty-amending authority, among others.141  As an example of this
last type of delegation, for example, commentators have frequently
cited the World Trade Organization (WTO) as involving a delegation
of treaty-amending authority because the WTO permits a three-
fourths majority of member states to adopt binding interpretations of
the terms of various trade agreements, and the power to interpret
those agreements can amount to the power to amend the terms of the
original agreement.142
The concerns that may loom large when considering the entire
universe of potential international delegations diminish considerably
when the focus is limited to the combination of regulatory treaties
and implementing legislation on which this Article focuses.  This Sec-
tion examines three arguments for reinvigorating the nondelegation
doctrine.  The first two concern features of international institutions:
their lack of accountability and the United States’ limited control over
these institutions. Neither justifies a stricter application of the
nondelegation doctrine to either content-assimilation or procedure-
triggering provisions.  Finally, this Section turns to the argument that
139. See Ku, supra note 4, at 101 (noting that “just as a legislative act raises delegation R
concerns if it does not specify standards constraining an agency’s discretion, a broadly
worded international agreement could effectively transfer the power to make international
agreements, which is sometimes also the power to make binding federal law, to an interna-
tional organization”); see also Swaine, supra note 15, at 1515–18 (characterizing powers del- R
egated to international institutions as “resembl[ing] [powers] that the U.S. Congress might
exercise under the Commerce Clause”).
140. Ku, supra note 4, at 101.  So far this type of delegation of legislative authority to an R
international body is theoretical rather than actual; commentators have described many
examples of international institutions exercising authority that resembles power which
Congress might itself exercise, but they have not offered examples of the next step—deci-
sions to treat them as self-executing. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Struc-
tural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1595 (2003) (proposing
treating such decisions as non-self-executing on U.S. courts).
141. See supra note 24. R
142. See Ku, supra note 4, at 96–99. But see Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The R
Myth of International Delegation, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (manu-
script at 10–11), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/dsworkshop/guzman.pdf
(arguing that “despite the formal voting rules, WTO decisions are, and as far as anybody
can tell will continue to be, the product of consensus; giving every state the ability to pre-
vent a rule change”).
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international delegations must be constrained because they upset the
balance of powers among the federal branches, and argues that the
treaty-implementing provisions on which this Article focuses in fact
help to maintain a balance of powers.
1. International Institutions’ Lack of Accountability
Both supporters and skeptics of international regulatory regimes
have articulated concerns about the accountability of international in-
stitutions.143  Decisionmaking at the international level frequently
lacks transparency,144 although treaty-based regimes are better in this
regard than less formal means of international decisionmaking be-
cause they “operate in significant part through formal, public legal
acts, and typically make decisions through established rules and
processes.”145  Moreover, the multiplicity of actors makes assigning re-
sponsibility for a given outcome particularly difficult: “decisions will
often be attributable to domestic, foreign, and international actors to-
gether.  For good reason—often these actors must act in common.”146
In contrast, as John Yoo has pointed out, state governments are much
more accountable: “State officials are still responsible to the people of
a state; indeed, because of their closer proximity to the electorate,
state officials may be even more responsive to their constituents than
federal officials.”147
International institutions’ lack of accountability is particularly
troubling when an international delegation takes place without con-
gressional action.  But, as Curtis Bradley has suggested, congressional
143. See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 25, at 26 (“In our view, interna- R
tional lawyers can no longer credibly argue that there are no real democracy or legitimacy
deficits in global administrative governance because global regulatory bodies answer to
states, and the governments of those states answer to their voters and courts.”); see also Ku,
supra note 4, at 121–26. But see Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and R
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 37 (2005) (conceding the weak-
ness in democratic accountability of international bodies but arguing that multilateral in-
stitutions are highly constrained by other accountability mechanisms, including
supervisory accountability by member states, and fiscal accountability, since multilateral
organizations are subsidized by member states).
144. See Bradley, supra note 140, at 1558 (noting that the lack of transparency in interna- R
tional decisionmaking may increase concerns about accountability).
145. Stewart, supra note 5, at 69; see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER R
217–30 (2004).
146. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 25, at 54. R
147. John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 122 (1998).
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action can mitigate this concern.148  After all, once Congress has im-
plemented a treaty, it carries a formidable democratic pedigree: the
treaty’s norms have become the law of the land only after securing
approval from the President, at least two-thirds of the Senate, and a
majority of the members of the House of Representatives. As Eric Pos-
ner and Adrian Vermeule note, “Congress is accountable when it dele-
gates power.”149  If the recipient of the power exercises it poorly,
Congress can step back in with new legislation.  In fact, Congress
often uses that power in the domestic context,150 and, as Part III.B.3
will explain in more detail, there is no reason to believe that Congress
will hesitate to use that power when it’s implementing an interna-
tional treaty.
Although commentators correctly observe that the Supreme
Court has expressed concern when legislation muddles the lines of
authority for policymaking,151 the Court has upheld Congress’s crea-
tion of independent agencies where those lines are quite tangled.
Take, for example, the United States Sentencing Commission.  The
Commission’s output is to some extent the product of each of the
three branches: members of the Sentencing Commission are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
some of whom must be federal judges on a list submitted to the Presi-
dent by the Judicial Conference of the United States.152  The regula-
tions promulgated by the Commission are binding but can, of course,
be overturned by Congress.153
2. Control over International Decisionmaking
In explaining why international delegations trouble them, some
commentators point to the inability of the United States to control
decisionmaking or outcomes at the international level.  Ku empha-
sizes the executive branch’s limited ability to subject international or-
ganizations to oversight; “[i]ndeed,” he writes, “one of the main goals
of creating more effective international organizations is to limit their
control by member states.”154  In a similar vein, Swaine emphasizes
that the United States is but one of many principals shaping the out-
148. See Bradley, supra note 140, at 1587 (arguing that if decisions by international bod- R
ies are treated as non-self-executing, the decisions will only be binding if they are imple-
mented by Congress).
149. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 98, at 1748 (emphasis omitted). R
150. Id.
151. See Ku, supra note 4, at 123. R
152. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
153. See id. at 367.
154. Ku, supra note 4, at 124. R
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come at the international level.155  While these arguments about the
decisionmaking processes at international institutions may bear on
other types of international delegations such as the self-executing sub-
sidiary decisions described above, it’s not clear why this factor is at all
relevant to assessing implementing legislation passed by Congress.
Indeed, the fact that the executive branch is one of the principals
directing decisionmaking at the international institutional level seems
to make statutory assimilations of those decisions less troubling than
delegations to states or private actors because the President continues
to play an important role in the international decisionmaking process.
Indeed, as Louis Henkin points out, “[i]n the few organizations that
formally have power to make binding regulations, the United States
has either a veto, the benefits of ‘weighted voting,’ or other special
voting arrangements that render it difficult for any regulation to be
established without U.S. concurrence.”156
Even where the international institution might make a substan-
tive decision over the objections of the United States, the United
States always retains the option of breaching the treaty157 or withdraw-
ing from the treaty altogether.  Regulatory treaties by their own terms
often give parties the right to terminate their participation, typically
some specified time after furnishing proper notice.158  Some com-
mentators object that the costs of exercising this option are so high
that it is rarely a realistic one.159  In fact these costs vary: the costs of
withdrawing from a regulatory treaty like the Stockholm Convention
155. Swaine, supra note 15, at 1561 (“Once an international institution has been R
brokered, moreover, the U.S. government remains one among multiple principals, or be-
comes part of a collective principal, making it more difficult to correct any drift from its
preferences.”); see also Bradley, supra note 140, at 1558 (“By transferring legal authority R
from U.S. actors to international actors—actors that are physically and culturally more
distant from, and not directly responsible to, the U.S. electorate—these delegations may
entail a dilution of domestic political accountability.”).
156. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 263 (2d ed.
1996).
157. Id. at 211 (noting that international law “recognizes the power—though not the
right—of a state party to break a treaty and pay damages or abide other international
consequences”).
158. Id.; e.g., Stockholm Convention, supra note 6, art. 28 (permitting withdrawal with R
one year’s notice at any time after the Convention has been in effect for three years);
Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, art. 19 (permitting withdrawal after one year’s notice at R
any time after four years of assuming specified obligations); Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, supra note 32, art. 29 (permitting denunciation after up to one year’s notice R
any time after the Convention has been in force for two years).
159. See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 15, at 1540 (“On the international plane, withdrawal is R
costly by design and infrequently done.”).
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are certainly lower than the costs of withdrawing from the United Na-
tions,160 making the availability of this option analytically relevant.
3. Maintaining a Balance of Federal Powers
Another problem commentators have identified with interna-
tional delegations is that they shift the balance of powers among the
federal branches in favor of the executive branch.161 In fact, the type
of implementing legislation on which this Article focuses is part of the
solution rather than part of the problem.  Congress’s role in treaty
implementation has been termed “a critical check on executive pow-
ers in foreign affairs.”162  More stringent enforcement of the nondele-
gation principles would impose costs on congressional actions—and
would make it harder for Congress to exercise a key check on execu-
tive power.
While Congress’s power is attenuated in the foreign affairs
arena,163 Congress does not lack authority to implement regulatory
treaties.  As a textual matter, regulation of production or consump-
tion of ozone-depleting chemicals, persistent organic pollutants, or
psychotropic substances falls within the core of Congress’s ability to
regulate interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution.  There is no question that Congress could pass legislation im-
posing the substantive requirements eventually demanded by
subsidiary decisions taken at the international level in the absence of
those subsidiary decisions.164
Moreover, in contrast to other foreign affairs areas, Congress
doesn’t lack incentives to involve itself in implementing international
160. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1608–09 (2005) (sug-
gesting that withdrawals from certain treaties “are likely to fall below the political radar
screen”).
161. See Bradley, supra note 140, at 1558–59. R
162. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Origi-
nal Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1986 (1999).
163. Swaine, supra note 15, at 1558–59. R
164. Because Congress clearly has the authority to regulate in these areas even in the
absence of a treaty, the implementing legislation does not raise federalism concerns that
may be at issue with other treaties.  In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the Su-
preme Court concluded that at least some federalism limits on Congress’s legislative au-
thority fall away when Congress uses its treaty power. See id. at  416, 431–35 (holding that
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 was not an unconstitutional encroachment of state
power because the nature of the problem addressed in the treaty demanded concerted
international action).  Scholars continue to debate the extent to which federalism does
and ought to limit the types of international arrangements in which the United States
participates. E.g., Barry Friedman, Federalism’s Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1441 (1994); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1867 (2005).
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regulatory treaties.  As each of the examples in Part II make clear,
Congress is dealing primarily with the intra-territorial effect of the va-
rious regulatory treaties.  The regulated entities are the constituents
of individual members who should have no special trouble securing
attention from Congress.165
There is one sense in which Congress’s authority is more limited
when it writes legislation that prospectively incorporates the decisions
of international bodies than when Congress delegates to executive
branch agencies.  In the context of decisions by executive agencies,
Congress can rely on tools at its disposal other than writing new legis-
lation—such as holding oversight hearings—to call those agencies to
account.  But this oversight authority is lacking whenever Congress en-
acts statutes that include content-assimilation provisions.  After pass-
ing the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act at issue in Sharpnack, for
example, Congress could not exercise such authority over state legisla-
tures,166 and the same goes for the foreign governments whose laws
the Lacey Act assimilates.167  Because Congress is assimilating the deci-
sions of bodies that are not its agents—the assimilation statutes are
likely to play a fairly trivial role, if any at all, in the decisionmaking
processes of the international bodies.  If the decisions made by inter-
national bodies displease members of Congress, their only option is to
write new legislation.
Resurrecting a more stringent version of the nondelegation doc-
trine risks eliminating Congress from having any role at all in deter-
mining whether and how to implement subsidiary decisions.  Take,
for example, the Montreal Protocol and its provision for the parties to
hold meetings at regular intervals.168  In practice, the parties have
held these meetings annually (and, in a couple of exceptional cases,
more than once per year).169  If Congress supports implementing
those subsidiary decisions but is constitutionally prohibited from en-
acting legislation that pre-commits agencies to doing so, it will retain
at least two options.  First, Congress might limit itself to passing legis-
lation directing the EPA to implement decisions that have already
been made.  But the chance that Congress will promptly react and
respond each time such a decision is made is—at best—slim.  Second,
165. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (citing example of regulated entity’s en- R
gagement in debate over proposed implementing legislation).
166. See generally United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 124–128. R
168. Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, art. 11, para. 1. R
169. U.N. Env’t Programme, Meetings of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, http://ozone.unep.org/Events/Meet-
ings_MOP.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
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Congress might pass legislation that authorizes, but doesn’t require,
the EPA to implement subsidiary decisions.  By passing such legisla-
tion Congress would remove itself from having any role in deciding
whether such decisions should be implemented or not; the result
would leave implementation decisions exclusively in the hands of the
executive branch.
IV. BROADER SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS REGARDING
DELEGATIONS
The last section argued that treaty-implementing legislation can
have salutary effects on the balance of power.  This Part considers the
possibility that Congress has overreached.  After all, the nondelega-
tion doctrine is not the only limitation on Congress’s ability to dele-
gate authority to other entities—broader separation of powers
principles impose another.170  These principles are relevant in evalu-
ating the role of international bodies in both content-assimilation and
procedure-triggering provisions; both Justice Scalia and academic
commentators have argued that these separation of powers concerns
are heightened where Congress has delegated to a body other than an
executive branch agency.  This Part argues that neither type of imple-
menting provision violates separation of powers because neither type
of provision reflects an aggrandizement of congressional authority or
an encroachment on executive authority.
In evaluating whether statutory arrangements violate the separa-
tion of powers, the Supreme Court’s analysis has focused on encroach-
ment and aggrandizement.  In Morrison v. Olson,171 for example, the
Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to a statute that “al-
lows for the appointment of an ‘independent counsel’ to investigate
and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government offi-
cials for violations of federal criminal laws.”172  The Supreme Court
observed that the statute “does not involve an attempt by Congress to
increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch,”173
does not work “any judicial usurpation of properly executive func-
170. Thus, in Mistretta v. United States, the Supreme Court turned to separation of pow-
ers arguments after concluding that the statute creating the federal Sentencing Commis-
sion did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.  488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).  Likewise, in
Bowsher v. Synar, the Court identified as the problem not that Congress’s statute lacked an
intelligible principle, but that Congress had impermissibly encroached on the President’s
executive authority.  478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986).
171. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
172. Id. at 660.
173. Id. at 694.
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tions,”174 and does not impermissibly undermine executive branch
powers.175
Both Harold Krent and the Office of Legal Counsel have argued
that delegations outside of the federal government may pose both en-
croachment and aggrandizement problems.176  Krent points out that
“if the delegates outside the federal government are accountable in-
stead to Congress, Congress may be able to keep the reins of power
without facing direct electoral accountability for the subsequent for-
mulation of policy.”177  He also argues that such delegations may en-
croach on the President’s role in administering the execution of
legislative enactments because such delegations don’t allow the Presi-
dent to appoint or remove the officials who are making the key poli-
cymaking decisions178—aspects of executive control that both
Morrison and Mistretta highlight.
A. Congressional Aggrandizement
Even though it allows an entity outside the federal government to
determine certain aspects of agency action, implementing legislation
that takes into account regulatory treaties’ subsidiary decisions does
not reflect congressional aggrandizement.  The key reason is that the
international institutions at issue simply are not agents of Congress in
any meaningful sense.
To illustrate how Congress might aggrandize itself by delegating
to an entity outside the federal government, Krent sets out a hypothet-
ical in which Congress writes a statute delegating authority to the
head of the Brookings Institution, a highly regarded think tank with
considerable economic expertise, to make certain key budgetary deci-
sions.179  He points out that Congress would be the only entity that
could remove Brookings from power—it could do so by passing a new
statute undoing the delegation.180  Although Congress wouldn’t re-
174. Id. at 695 (emphasis omitted).
175. Id.
176. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Ad-
ministrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 67 (1990); The
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. Off. Le-
gal Counsel 124, 176 (1996) (noting that the “anti-aggrandizement principle” prohibits
Congress from assuming executive functions, and further explaining that “legislation dele-
gating federal authority to state or local officials or private persons could undermine the
executive branch’s ability to carry out its functions”).
177. Krent, supra note 176, at 67. R
178. Id.
179. Id. at 79.  This hypothetical is a variation of the statute at issue in Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
180. Krent, supra note 176, at 79. R
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tain any other oversight authority, “[t]he delegate would know that it
owed its authority to Congress, and would likely conform its actions in
light of that knowledge,” thus allowing Congress to aggrandize itself
by directing not only the passage of laws but also their execution.181
This argument doesn’t extend to the subsidiary decisions at issue
in this Article.  As discussed earlier, the international bodies aren’t
quite agents of Congress.182  Unlike the Brookings Institution in the
above hypothetical, the threat of Congress’s disapproval is not likely to
have any significant effect on the international decisionmakers.
B. Encroaching on Executive Authority
In evaluating whether Congress had gone too far in interfering
with executive authority in the context of the independent counsel
statute at issue in Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court asked whether
the statute upset the constitutional balance between the branches by
impeding the executive branch’s ability to accomplish its “constitu-
tionally assigned functions.”183  Having identified the relevant func-
tion as supervising prosecution of crimes, the Court then looked to
the ways in which the statute reduced the executive branch’s capacity
to do so.184  The Court concluded that the Attorney General and the
President retained enough control to satisfy constitutional require-
ments, giving three reasons: first, the independent counsel could be
fired for good cause; second, no independent counsel could be ap-
pointed without the Attorney General’s action; and third, “the juris-
diction of the independent counsel is defined with reference to the
facts submitted by the Attorney General, and once a counsel is ap-
pointed, the Act requires that the counsel abide by Justice Depart-
ment policy unless it is not ‘possible’ to do so.”185
The key constitutionally assigned functions at issue here are the
President’s powers to negotiate and make treaties.186  The precise
contours of the President’s negotiation authority are not clear.  The
181. Id.
182. See supra Part III.B.3.
183. 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443
(1977)).
184. Id. at 691, 695–96.
185. Id. at 696.
186. Louis Henkin explains the distinct roles of the Executive:
[T]he President wears two different, distinct hats.  His Executive power includes
the duty to take care that the laws, including treaties and customary international
law insofar as they are part of U.S. law, be faithfully executed.  But the President,
we know, also has independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs as Exec-
utive, as treaty-maker, as sole organ, and as Commander in Chief.
HENKIN, supra note 156, at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
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most relevant provision is Article II, Section 2: the President “shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”187
No form of the verb “negotiate” made its way into the text.  Nor has
the Supreme Court said very much about it.188  Nevertheless, the core
of the President’s “sole organ” power is fairly uncontroversial: the
President, as head of the executive branch, has a monopoly over for-
mal diplomatic communications.  Only the President or his agents in
the executive branch may speak for the United States.189  It is also
undisputed that Congress may not direct the President to vote a cer-
tain way in an international forum.  Although Presidents have argued
that Congress unconstitutionally interferes with the presidential role
as negotiator and maker of treaties by directing them to consult “with
private parties in connection with the conduct of international rela-
tions” or to disclose certain kinds of information about international
negotiations,190 courts have not addressed the issue and Congress con-
tinues to write and enact legislation with both types of provisions,191 so
their constitutionality remains unsettled.
Even if one accepted these contested executive branch claims re-
garding consultation or information disclosure, to consider proce-
dure-triggering provisions in the implementing legislation an
unconstitutional interference with the President’s constitutionally as-
signed negotiation authority is to take a staggeringly broad view of
both the scope of exclusive executive authority and of what constitutes
interference with it.  Take, for example, the procedure-triggering pro-
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
188. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 68–69 (1990) (re-
ferring to the “relatively few judicial decisions that have construed the basic constitutional
structure and text with regard to foreign-affairs matters over the past two centuries”).
189. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2000) (explaining
that “all formal diplomatic communications with foreign states are to be under [the Presi-
dent’s] exclusive control . . . not only the states, but Congress itself, is entirely excluded
from the field”).
190. Moschella Letter, supra note 88, at 2–3. R
191. Id. at 3.  For example, the 2002 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act imposed the following requirement upon the Secretary of
State before giving aid to the Colombian Armed Forces: “At least 10 days prior to making
the determination and certification required by this section, and every 120 days thereafter
during fiscal year 2002, the Secretary of State shall consult with internationally recognized
human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting the conditions contained in
subsection (a).”  Pub. L. No. 107-115 § 567(b), 115 Stat. 2118.  Subsection(a), in turn,
conditions foreign aid to the Colombian Armed Forces only upon certain findings. Id.
§ 567(a); see also Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 49, 50 (Jan. 10,
2002) (objecting to section 567(b)).
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visions in the proposed implementing legislation for the Stockholm
Convention.192  As described earlier, these provisions would require
the EPA to supply notice and request comment whenever a proposal
for regulating a new substance as a persistent organic pollutant ad-
vances through the three-stage process set out in the Stockholm Con-
vention.193  The most critical feature of the notice requirement in the
proposed implementing legislation is that it does not require the dis-
closure of any confidential information that might hamper the United
States’ ability to pursue its interests as a party to the Stockholm Con-
vention.  To the contrary, the notice requirement demands release of
information that is available to every party to the treaty.194  Moreover,
under the Stockholm Convention, organizations with observer status
have the same access to information as parties to the treaty.195  Those
observer organizations include public interest and industry groups
that have been active in the implementation debate in the United
States,196 which means that the notice-and-comment provisions will re-
quire disclosure only of information to which the most interested of
the interest groups already have access.  As for the comment provi-
sions in the proposed implementing legislation, they leave complete
discretion to the executive branch to figure out how to best make use
of them; the statutory provisions don’t require the EPA to act on the
received comments in any way.197
The content-assimilation provisions likewise do not encroach on
executive authority.  It is indisputable that the presence of legislation
staking out Congress’s position before subsidiary decisions are taken
at the international level may affect how the President goes about ne-
gotiating on the international plane.  But it can’t be the case that any
congressional action that affects executive branch negotiations uncon-
stitutionally encroaches on the executive branch’s prerogatives.  After
all, the absence of implementing legislation would also affect the Pres-
192. 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(2) (2000).  Similar provisions in the legislation for the Psycho-
tropic Substances Convention requires such notice and comment whenever proposals are
made to add or delete a drug from the schedule, or to transfer a drug from one schedule
to another. See supra Part II.C.
193. See supra Part II.C.
194. Stockholm Convention, supra note 6, arts. 9 & 10. R
195. Id. art. 8, para. 4(a).
196. For example, public interest groups concerned with the Stockholm Convention
include: the Center for International Environmental Law, Physicians for Social Responsi-
bility, the Sierra Club, and the World Wildlife Fund.  One of the industry groups that has
been active in the domestic debate includes CropLife International. See Stockholm Con-
vention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, List of Agencies Seeking Observer Status at the
First Meeting, http://www.pops.int/documents/meetings/cop_1/NGO_IGO.htm.
197. See supra Part II.C.
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ident’s negotiations on the international plane, as would nonbinding
resolutions expressing congressional views regarding upcoming nego-
tiations, which are generally accepted as constitutional (at least so
long as they don’t micromanage the President’s negotiations).198  Ex
ante, it’s hard to predict whether the President’s goal for a given ne-
gotiation could be achieved more easily in the presence or absence of
such legislation.
Lastly, the President retains the ultimate authority to unilaterally
terminate the United States’ participation in a treaty.199  Although
both the Senate and Congress as a whole have claimed that the Presi-
dent can’t terminate a treaty without their participation, they have
failed to establish an authority on their part to join or veto him.200  As
a matter of fact, the decision to terminate a treaty remains the Presi-
dent’s alone because he represents the United States at the interna-
tional level.201
V. SUBSIDIARY DECISIONS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This final Part argues that treaty-implementing legislation that
takes into account subsidiary decisions does not call for any special
rules of statutory interpretation; to the contrary, the familiar two-step
analysis articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.202 proves adequate.  Under the framework set out in Chev-
ron, courts will defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it ad-
ministers unless Congress has clearly communicated its intent:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
198. Howard R. Sklamberg, The Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The Senate’s Constitu-
tional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 445, 464–65 (1997) (arguing that in the
negotiation context, the Senate may offer recommendations on broad policy goals but not
day-to-day-strategy).
199. Cf. Krent, supra note 176, at 96 (“When the executive branch retains effective veto R
power, . . . the potential for encroachment into executive prerogatives is slim.”).
200. HENKIN, supra note 156, at 212.  In Goldwater v. Carter, a plurality of Justices invoked R
the political question doctrine and declined to assess the merits of the claim that the Presi-
dent may unilaterally terminate a treaty.  444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
201. See HENKIN, supra note 156, at 212. R
202. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.203
Unless Congress has clearly expressed its desire to pre-commit to sub-
sidiary decisions taken at the international level and clearly directed
agencies to comply with those subsidiary decisions, courts should read
that legislation to permit but not to require agency actions to conform to
subsidiary decisions taken at the international level.  The ordinary
Chevron framework both accords proper deference to the executive
branch’s interpretation of international treaties and ensures that at
least one of the political branches commits to incorporating the deci-
sions of an international institution into domestic law before agencies
give those decisions binding effect in the form of domestic regula-
tions.  By way of illustration, this Part will loop back to the statutory
interpretation question at issue in NRDC v. EPA, and argue that the
D.C. Circuit reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.
As Part II.B explained, the question in NRDC v. EPA was the ex-
tent to which (if at all) Congress had pre-committed the EPA to imple-
ment certain subsidiary decisions (Article 11 decisions204) regarding
methyl bromide made by the parties to the Montreal Protocol.205
Aiming to avoid “serious constitutional questions,” the court con-
cluded that no aspect of these Article 11 decisions bound the EPA.206
This Article has demonstrated that closer scrutiny reveals those consti-
tutional concerns lack foundation.  Nevertheless, because the statu-
tory provisions governing implementation of the Montreal Protocol
do not clearly reveal whether Congress intended the EPA to abide by
every aspect of those consensus decisions, the court correctly found
that the EPA’s regulations survived judicial challenge.
The Montreal Protocol contemplates three means of modifying
or elaborating the parties’ obligations.207  First, like other treaties, the
Protocol might be amended; this is the default procedure for chang-
ing parties’ obligations.  Second, the Protocol might be adjusted; this
procedure is used to modify the phase-out schedules of chemicals the
parties have already agreed to regulate.208  Finally, the parties to the
Protocol might make Article 11 decisions—certain additional deci-
sions that are necessary to effectively implement the treaty.209
203. Id. at 842–43.
204. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. R
205. NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
206. Id. at 9.
207. See supra Part II.B.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. R
209. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. R
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The legislation implementing the Montreal Protocol unequivo-
cally directs the EPA to implement amendments and adjustments.  As
discussed above, in legislation passed shortly after the United States
ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1988, Congress amended the Clean
Air Act to define “Montreal Protocol” to mean the “Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer” and “adjustments
adopted by Parties thereto and amendments that have entered into
force.”210  A separate provision directs the Administrator of the EPA
to promulgate regulations establishing a more stringent phase-out
schedule for listed substances if “the Montreal Protocol is modified to
include a schedule to control or reduce production, consumption, or
use of any substance more rapidly than the applicable schedule under
this subchapter.”211
The statute is ambiguous as to whether Congress intended the
EPA to be bound by Article 11 decisions.  The implementing legisla-
tion doesn’t mention them specifically.  Two other provisions are rele-
vant to this analysis.  Specific to methyl bromide, the implementing
legislation provides: “To the extent consistent with the Montreal Pro-
tocol, the Administrator, after notice and the opportunity for public
comment, . . . may exempt the production, importation, and con-
sumption of methyl bromide for critical uses.”212  The implementing
legislation also provides that it should “not be construed, interpreted,
or applied to abrogate the responsibilities or obligations of the United
States to implement fully the provisions of the Montreal Protocol.  In
the case of conflict between any provision of this subchapter and any
provision of the Montreal Protocol, the more stringent provision shall
govern.”213
As the briefing in the NRDC case demonstrates, the statutory lan-
guage can support multiple interpretations.  The Methyl Bromide In-
dustry Panel makes a colorable argument that Congress did not
intend the EPA to implement Article 11 decisions at all.214  The Indus-
try Panel focuses on the statutory definition of “Montreal Protocol,”
which—as quoted above—does not explicitly refer to Article 11 deci-
sions.215  There is a strong response to this argument, however.  The
text of the Montreal Protocol anticipates subsidiary decisions.  More
significantly, the provisions addressing methyl bromide anticipate Ar-
210. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7671e(a)(3) (2000).
212. Id. § 7671c(d)(6).
213. Id. § 7671m(b).
214. Supplemental Brief for Intervenor, supra note 65, at 11–12. R
215. Id. at 11.
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ticle 11 decisions: Article 2H prohibits production or consumption of
methyl bromide after January 1, 2005, except “to the extent that the
Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption that
is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be critical uses.”216
Under the Chevron framework, the ambiguity in these statutory
provisions would oblige a court to accept the EPA’s interpretation so
long as it was reasonable.217  Congress could require the EPA to im-
plement Article 11 decisions, but to do so it must enact statutory provi-
sions that clearly direct the EPA to abide by these decisions.  Because
Congress did not speak clearly here, the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that
the EPA is not obliged to implement Article 11 decisions in their en-
tirety is correct.
The Chevron framework is consistent with the obligation on courts
to pay “great weight” to the meaning given to treaties “by the depart-
ments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement.”218  As the discussion above and in Part II.B illustrates,
especially where statutory language is ambiguous, an agency’s inter-
pretation of a congressional statute may depend on the agency’s inter-
pretation of the underlying treaty.  This obligation makes courts
reluctant to find that the executive branch’s implementation of a
treaty violates Congress’s implementing statute, even in the absence of
the international nondelegation wrinkle.  For example, in 2001, the
D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to a regulation that the Department
of the Interior had promulgated pursuant to the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA).219  This statute implements four different treaties
protecting migratory birds.220  The plaintiff in the D.C. Circuit case
216. Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, art. 2H, para. 5.  Indeed, the EPA argued that R
this provision showed that the “United States agreed to accept future decisions of the par-
ties on only two narrow issues: (1) what uses are critical and (2) the amount of methyl
bromide that could be produced and imported after the 2005 phase-out to satisfy those
uses,” because “[t]hese are the only two decisions that are specifically called for by the
Montreal Protocol itself.”  Supplemental Brief for the Respondent, supra note 63, at 6–7. R
Thus, the EPA argued, the numerical limits on production and importation set out in
Decision Ex. I/3 are binding. Id. at 7–8.
217. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. R
218. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2685 (2006) (quoting Kolovrat v. Ore-
gon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).
219. Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001), superseded by statute, Migratory Bird
Treaty Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 143, 118 Stat. 2809, 3071–72, as recog-
nized in Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also
16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2000) (amended by the Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809).
220. Hill, 275 F.3d at 99–100.  The treaty discussed in Hill is the Protocol Amending the
1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Dec. 14, 1995, U.S.-Can., S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 104-28.
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challenged regulations that excluded the mute swan from the official
list of protected migratory birds.221  The court reviewed the question
under the familiar two-step framework set out in Chevron.222  Inquiring
first whether Congress had spoken to the precise question at issue, the
court found that “the plain meaning of the statute and the applicable
treaties strongly indicate that mute swans are qualifying migratory
birds under the MBTA.”223  Nevertheless, the court hesitated to de-
cide the case on step one in part “because of the odd regulatory
scheme created by the MBTA which refers to four different treaties to
glean a single substantive definition of migratory birds.”224  It found
instead that the Interior Department floundered on step two in light
of the support for the plaintiff’s position in the text of the treaties and
the statute, as well as the absence of anything in the statute, applicable
treaties, or administrative record to justify the exclusion of mute
swans,225 thus giving the executive branch another opportunity to ex-
plain why its interpretation of the treaties was reasonable.
Chevron analysis is also consistent with the canon of interpretation
(sometimes called the Charming Betsy canon226) requiring courts to
“be most cautious before interpreting . . . domestic legislation in such
manner as to violate international agreements.”227  In the administra-
tive law context, this canon urges courts to read ambiguous statutes to
permit (but not to require) agencies to take actions that are necessary
to comply with international legal obligations.  The D.C. Circuit has
invoked the Charming Betsy canon in the context of a subsidiary deci-
sion of an international body.  In George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA,228 the
D.C. Circuit reviewed the consistency of certain regulations that the
EPA modified to comply with the determination of the WTO’s dispute
settlement body that the earlier version of the regulations violated the
United States’ obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade treaty.229  The parties challenging the regulations argued
that the modifications violated the statute that the EPA was imple-
221. Hill, 275 F.3d at 99.
222. Id. at 104.
223. Id. at 99.
224. Id. at 99, 104–05.
225. Id. at 106.
226. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 & n.26 (2d Cir. 2003) (referring to Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
227. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
228. 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
229. Id. at 619–20.
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menting, but the court cited the Charming Betsy canon to support its
conclusion that the EPA’s reading of the statute was permissible.230
Thus, Chevron analysis leaves room both for a significant congres-
sional role in treaty implementation and for executive branch latitude
in interpreting treaties and assuring compliance with them.  It allows
Congress to pre-commit the executive branch to implement subsidiary
decisions, but requires it to speak clearly to accomplish this goal.
Where Congress’s implementing legislation is ambiguous, it requires
deference to the executive branch’s interpretation.  And, reinforced
by the Charming Betsy canon, Chevron analysis ensures that statutory
ambiguity is not read to preclude the executive branch from choosing
to comply with subsidiary decisions taken on the international plane
where it chooses to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to demonstrate that the nondelegation argu-
ments that have been raised to challenge legislation implementing
regulatory treaties lack a doctrinal foundation.  In doing so, it high-
lights the need for precision in analyzing international delegations.
The “unconstitutional delegation” label has been attached to a great
variety of institutional arrangements.  Even if some of those arrange-
ments are constitutionally troubling, the constitutional problems they
pose are not all equally grave.  What is more, even within the category
of implementing legislation, there are distinctions.  More precise anal-
ysis of different types of institutional arrangements is a prerequisite
for distinguishing more serious objections from less serious objec-
tions—and ultimately for figuring out how to address those constitu-
tional problems that remain without undercutting the ability of the
United States to effectively address environmental, safety, and health
issues on a global level.
230. Id. at 624.
